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Mabanta and Skloot: A Lower "Salt" Content for Employers

A LOWER "SALT" CONTENT FOR EMPLOYERS
I. INTRODUCTION

It has been said that too much salt in your diet is unhealthy. But,
can the same proposition hold true in the context of a union organizing
drive? Initially, choosing to use the "salting" technique' on an employer
was a more difficult question for labor unions since "salts" were not
generally considered to be protected employees under the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").2 In certain circuits, labor unions did not
have the recourse of filing an unfair labor practice ("ULP") charge
against an employer if "salting" proved to be unsuccessful.3 Thus, prior
to Town & Country Electric, Inc.,4 labor unions might have argued for a
low-salt recipe. However, with the Supreme Court's decision in that
case, labor unions arguably began spicing up their union campaigns with
a touch of salt, now that employers had a potential ULP charge to fear.5
However, it appears with the National Labor Relation Board's ("NLRB"
or "the Board") recent decision in Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. ("Oil
Capitol I/,), 6 which arguably counteracts much of the protection
afforded to unions through the NLRB since Town & Country Electric,
Inc., the answer to the proverbial question will once again likely be that
too much salt will undoubtedly "spoil the broth."
1. Salting has been defined as "a technique where the union organizers apply for jobs at
nonunion companies with the intent of organizing their workers" from within once hired. Kenneth
N. Dickens, Comment, Town & Country Electric, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board: Salts:
We're Employees-What Happens Now?, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 561, 562 (1997).
2. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 147-87 (2000); see 2 COMM. ON THE
DEV. OF THE LAW UNDER THE NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS ACT, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE

BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2260 (John E. Higgins Jr. ed.,
BNA Books, 5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]; Dickens, supra note 1,at

563.
3. This resulted because of the former circuit split "on the issue of whether paid union
organizers" or "salts" were considered to be employees under the NLRA. See THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 2260.
4. 516 U.S. 85 (1995); Dickens, supra note 1,at 565.
5. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. at 98 (finding salts to be covered under the
NLRA).
6. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitol I1), 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at I (May
31,2007).
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With the continual decline in labor union membership, unions have
had to develop tactics to combat employers' resistance to unionization
within the workplace. 7 One successful, yet controversial method used
by unions in organizing employees is salting. 8 Generally, employers
respond to this tactic by denying employment to all applicants who they
believe have union affiliation. 9 The NLRB has continually reaffirmed
the notion that salts are "employees" under section 2(3) of the NLRA' °
and thus entitled to protection under section 8(a)(3).
The protection of the NLRA entitles "union salts" who feel they
were discriminated against in the hiring process to file a ULP charge
against the employer with the NLRB. 12 If the NLRB finds the
employer's actions constitute an unfair labor practice, part of the remedy
the Board can award the employee is backpay. 13 Traditionally, this
backpay remedy was based upon a presumption that had the salt been
hired, he or she would have worked for that employer for an indefinite
period of time. 1 4 The employer shouldered the burden of rebutting this
presumption and thus the law was arguably in the employees' favor.15
However, recent NLRB decisions, such as the groundbreaking case Oil
16
Capitol II, are tipping the scales in a more employer friendly direction.
The union, through the General Counsel, now has the burden of
establishing with affirmative evidence that the employee would have
been employed from the date employment was denied "until the

7. Dickens, supra note 1, at 561-62; Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The ProtectedStatus
of Paid Union Organizers, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (1995).
8. Dickens, supra note 1, at 562.

9.
10.
....

Note, supra note 7, at 1341.
See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) ("The term 'employee' shall include any employee
.).

11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); Dickens, supra note 1, at 562. Section 158(a)(3) of the NLRA
titled "Unfair labor practices by employer" provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer-by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization... " 29 U.S.C.
158(a)(3).
12. Dickens, supra note 1,at 565.
13. Id. at 567.
14. Ryan Poor & Michael Boldt, NLRB Removes "Salt" From Employers' Wounds,
INFORMED EMPLOYER BRIEFING (Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, I.N.), Sept. 28, 2007,

http://www.icemiller.com/enewsletter/InformedEmployerBriefing/Salting.htm.
15.

Id.

16. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitoll), 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (May 31, 2007); see
Poor & Boldt, supra note 14. One indication of an employer friendly ideology is "that employee
statutory rights must yield to countervailing business interests." Wilma Liebman, Decline and
Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 584 (2007).
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[employer] extends a valid job offer to the discriminatee." 1 7 Subsequent
cases have shown that Oil CapitolII has acted as a catalyst for additional
with respect to the evidentiary burden for the
changes by the NLRB
18
General Counsel.

This Note argues that recent NLRB decisions such as Oil Capitol II
have not only altered the law in this field, but have also had the effect of
putting employers in a more economically favorable position. Part II
provides a brief history on the unionization technique of salting, defines
the role and characterization of salts, and distinguishes the use of this
technique in the construction industry. Part III discusses the law
establishing "union salts" as protected "employees" under the NLRA.
Part IV describes the Wright Line' 9 test used by the NLRB to determine
whether the General Counsel has established a prima facie case that the
employer has committed an unfair labor practice. Part V examines the
remedies issued by the NLRB in hiring discrimination cases, i.e.,
backpay. Part VI provides a synopsis of the Oil Capitol II holding,
specifically in regards to the new evidentiary standard set forth with
respect to the establishment of backpay remedies. Further, this section
addresses the dissenting Board members' opinions. Part VII argues that
because of Oil Capitol II and its progeny, employers will inevitably
discriminate against union salts. Part VIII discusses the possible effect
that Oil CapitolII will have on the investigative and litigation strategies
of the General Counsel. Part IX includes both cases spawning from Oil
CapitolII and cases issued subsequently to Oil Capitol II, which used its
newly established framework. Part X provides a political analysis of the
impact of these decisions on the NLRB and the workforce. This Note
concludes, that these law-changing decisions have not only assisted
employers, but will potentially cause unions to rethink their usage of
salts as a unionization method.

17. Poor & Boldt, supranote 14.
18. See Press Release, National Labor Relations Board, NLRB Modifies Rule in Backpay
Cases Concerning Evidence of Employees' Job Search Efforts (Oct. 11, 2007), available at

(discussing St. George
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/Press%20Releases/2007/R-2644.pdf
Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (Sept. 30, 2007), which established a new rule for backpay cases
further increasing the evidentiary standard for the General Counsel in unfair labor practice cases
requiing a showing of efforts made by discriminatees to find interim employment).
19.

NLRB v. Wright Line (Wright Line 11), 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
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II. SALTING: PAST AND PRESENT

A. The Evolution of the Term and the Practiceof Salting

Salting is a term of art derived from similar phrases used to
describe scenarios in which something was artificially synthesized to

create the false appearance of a natural occurrence.2 ° Until the early
1990s, this technique was rarely utilized, possibly due to substantial

union membership, and thus was unnecessary. 2' A resurgence of this
unionizing technique potentially occurred in response to decisions such
as Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 22 which made it harder for unions to reach

employees on an employer's premises, provided that reasonable access
to employees was available outside of the workplace.2 3 Since in most

cases this decision in effect prevented unions from organizing at the
workplace, they again began to utilize this resourceful method of
organizing from within the place of employment to reach employees
24
more directly.

Salting involves unions sending organizers, commonly referred to
as salts, to companies to seek employment so once hired they can
motivate employees to unionize.25 Salts can be either professionals or
volunteers.26 Professionals are in effect seeking dual employment since

20. See Tualatin Elec., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 129, 130 n.3 (1993) (discussing the potential origin
of salting in unions based upon the usage of the term in the mining and accounting industries). It
has also been argued that salting, although not necessarily referred to as such, dates even farther
back to the turn of the century when "Industrial Workers of the World" used this method "to
organize lumber camps." Dickens, supra note 1, at 564.
21. See Dickens, supranote 1, at 564.
22. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
23. Id. at 537 ("Where reasonable alternative means of access exist, [section] 7's guarantees
do not authorize trespasses by nonemployee organizers, even... 'under... reasonable regulations'
established by the Board."). The Court found "reasonable access" to include tactics such as
mailings, phone calls, and home visits. Id. at 540.
24. See Note, supra note 7, at 1341.
25. Dickens, supra note 1, at 562; Note, supra note 7, at 1347. A salt has been defined as "a
union person who applies for a job with an employer for the purpose of initiating a union organizing
campaign." Workplace Prof Blog: NLRB Changes Standard for Proving Damages in Salting Cases,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprofblog/2007/06/nlrb-changes-st.html
(June 5, 2007)
[hereinafter NLRB Changes Standard].
26. Note, supra note 7, at 1341; see also Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitol 11), 349
N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at I n.5 (May 31, 2007) (stating that regardless of the fact that some
union salts receive compensation while others do not, they share the collective goal of furthering a
unionizing initiative). The Board made clear that their holding would apply equally in this case to
both paid and unpaid salts. Id., slip op. at 2 n.6.
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they will also continue to receive a full salary from the union for their
services.27 Volunteers perform the same function except generally the
compensation they receive from the union is merely "the difference
between the union wage scale and the pay at the new job. 28 Some
unions send salts into an industry with a legitimate desire to gain
employment with an employer so they can attempt to organize their coworkers while performing their expected duties as an employee of that
29
company. Other salts apply for positions assuming they will be denied
employment and thus setting the stage for potential litigation.3 ° In the
latter scenario, unions intend to undermine the employer's capacity to
combat unionizing attempts in the future, since the employer will likely
be economically damaged by the substantial backpay remedy imposed.3 '
B. Overt vs. Covert Salts
While some salts act covertly, not disclosing their union
membership while seeking employment, the majority act overtly,
revealing their union connection on various levels.32 It is possible that a
union salting campaign will concurrently encompass both overt and
covert salting techniques. 33 The union will make a calculated decision
based on their overall organizing plan when deciding which method will
be most effective for a particular situation or employer.34 Most often,
salting is a practice used in tandem with other unionizing
methodologies. 35 Therefore, it follows that the decision to salt in either
an overt or covert manner will vary with local needs and what will be
most effective for a particular area of employment.
An overt salt may openly disclose their union affiliation by wearing
apparel depicting the union name or symbol, or by indicating union
membership orally or in the hiring application.36 Disclosure of union
27.

Note, supra note 7, at 1341.

28. Id.
29. Susan E. Howe, To Be or Not to Be an Employee: That is the Question of Salting, 3 GEO.
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 515, 518-19 (1995); Poor & Boldt, supra note 14.
30. Howe, supra note 29, at 518-19. Many times the actual goal of a union salt is "to
precipitate the commission of unfair labor practices by startled employers." Hartman Bros. Heating
& Air Conditioning v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 2002).
31. Poor & Boldt, supra note 14.
32. Howe, supra note 29, at 519.
33. James L. Fox, "Salting" The Construction Industry, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 681, 684

(1998).
34. See id. at 684.
35.

See id. at 685.

36. Id. at 684.
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affiliation gives the employer notice of their organizing intentions,
which potentially can be used as evidence against the employer in future
discrimination based litigation.37 This establishes that the employer was
aware of the salt's union affiliation and did not hire him or her on that
basis. Conversely, covert salts intentionally cover up their union ties
when seeking employment with the targeted employer. 38
Such
concealment techniques can involve leaving out past employment with a
union or union affiliated employer and also purposefully misrepresenting
themselves when completing a job application. 39 However, in most
cases a salt's acting covertly will still reveal their union association at
some point after being hired, for tactical reasons.4 °
A common belief often acknowledged by courts while resolving
various labor disputes is that generally, employers have a natural
aversion to a unionized workplace.4 ' Although employers' distaste for
unions may stem from various reasons, the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW), Local 45 has suggested a chief explanation
is that employers will no longer dictate the employment terms and
conditions without first bargaining with the union.42
In fact,
"[e]mployers do lose flexibility in certain circumstances with a union
because the rights of both employer and employee are spelled out in a
legal, binding contract. For example, employers lose flexibility ...[t]o
layoff employees without recourse and employee input. ' ,43 Because of
this natural tendency, non-unionized employers typically respond to this
organizing technique by denying employment to all applicants with
union affiliation.44 Denial of employment generally leads the union 45to
respond by filing an unfair labor practice charge against the employer.
C. The Use of Salting in the Construction Industry
Like other trades, the construction industry in particular was greatly

37. Dickens, supra note 1,at 565.
38. Fox, supra note 33, at 684.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See NLRB v. E. Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Dislike of
unions is not uncommon among employers ...."),
overruled on other grounds by Wright Line 11,
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
42. IBEW
Local
45,
Why
Employers
Fight
Organization,
http://www.ibew45.org/about/employers~oppose.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
43. Id.
44. Note, supra note 7, at 1341.
45. Dickens, supra note 1,at 565.
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impacted by such decisions as Lechmere.46 This case granted employers
the right to exclude, prompting unions attempting to organize various
construction companies to implement various salting tactics in order to
reach potential union members.47 Aside from using this technique for
organizational purposes, unions often implement this method to inhibit
the ability of the "open-shop contractor" to conduct his work in a timely
and efficient manner.4 8 Unions in this industry have instituted programs
centered on this method to organize non-unionized contractors.49 In
1993, one program spanning across the United States was called
"Construction
Organizing
Membership
Education
Training"
("COMET"). 5 ° The construction industry differs from other areas of
employment in that employees work on specific projects that can be of
short duration versus working for an indefinite period of time in one
location. 51 Thus, the NLRB takes this into consideration if a remedy is
necessary in the event of a ULP. 2
III.

COVERAGE UNDER THE

NLRA

For an extended period of time, despite the Supreme Court's
holding in Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 there was a split among the United
States circuit courts with regard to whether union salts could receive
protection as "employees" under section 2(3) of the NLRA.54 The
Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., reversed the
NLRB's initial determination that paid union organizers were included
under the statutory term "employee., 55 The court did not view the word
to encompass those concurrently receiving compensation from unions as

46. Id. at 567-68.
47. See id.
48. Howe, supra note 29, at 518-19.
49. Dickens, supra note 1, at 567.
50. Howe, supra note 29, at 517. COMET was developed by the AFL-CIO, encompassing
fifteen
different construction related unions. Id.
51. Dean Gen. Contractors, 285 N.L.R.B. 573, 573 (1987) (recognizing the unique
characteristics about employment duration with respect to the construction industry); Note, supra
note 7, at 1346.
52. Dean Gen. Contractors,285 N.L.R.B. at 573; Note, supra note 7, at 1345-46.
53. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941) ("[R]efusal to hire [applicants]
solely because of their affiliation with the Union was an unfair labor practice under § 8(3) ....").
54. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 2260; Dickens, supra note 1, at 562-63.
55. Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 516 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1995); see also H.B. Zachry
Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that paid union organizers were not covered
under the definition of "employee" in the NLRA).
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well as the company they were attempting to unionize.56 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case because circuit
courts, such as the D.C. and Second Circuit, held contrary to the Eighth
Circuit's findings.57 The Court resolved this discrepancy and once and
for all established that hired union organizers were covered employees
under section 2(3).58
Discriminating against an employee covered under section 2(3) of
the NLRA is grounds for a filing a section 8(a)(3) 59 claim for employer
Depending on the nature of the circumstances
discrimination. 60
surrounding the employer's decision to deny employment to the salt, the
salt can respond by alleging one of two violations under section 2(3).61
One possibility for recourse is commonly known as a "failure to hire
violation," which is brought when union salts believe that there was job
availability and they were not hired solely based on their union
affiliation.62 In such cases, the General Counsel must establish that the
employment for a job in a specific area of
qualified applicant was denied
63
which there was availability.
The other alternative is a "failure to consider violation" which
alleges discriminatory exclusion from the entire hiring process by an
employer due to the applicant's connection with the union.64 The
general assumption is that had the individual been included, he or she
would have been considered qualified for the position and thus hired.65
This may occur where a salt submits a resume to an employer and is
denied an interview based on the employer's knowledge or belief that
the individual participates in union activity or is affiliated with a union.66
56. Town& Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 88.
57. Id.; Wilmar Elec. Serv., Inc., v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
("[individual" employed simultaneously by a union and a company is an 'employee' under § 2(3) of
the [NLRA]."); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding an individual
to be an employee when employed both by the company and the union).
58. Town & Country Elec., Inc, 516 U.S. at 98; Dickens, supra note 1,at 562-63. To support
their holding, the Court cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 226 (1959) for the proposition
that "[a) 'person may be the servant of two master.., at one time as to one act, if the service to one
does not involve abandonment of service to the other."' Id. at 94-95.
59. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000).
60. FES (a Division of Thermo Power) (FES), 331 N.L.R.B. 9, 12 (2000), aff'd, 301 F.3d 83
(3d Cir. 2002).
61. Seeid. at l2,15.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id. at 27 (Brame, M., concurring).
66. See generally id. at 15 (discussing discriminatory refusal to consider violations made by
employers).
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IV. THE WRIGHTLINE TEST

A test formulated by the Supreme Court in an earlier decision for
establishing an unfair labor practice in connection with a discriminatory
discharge decision made by an employer was adopted in NLRB v. Wright
Line ('Wright Line J1").67 In some cases the employers' reasoning for
their actions is a mere pretext for their motive to discriminate based on
union affiliation, thus an NLRA violation will be more straightforward.6 8

In other cases, the employers' basis for their conduct will be less
obvious and thus constitute what has been commonly termed a "mixed"
or "dual-motive.

'69

A "mixed-motive"

situation exists when an

employer can be seen to have both permissible or legitimate business
reasons and also impermissible or non-legitimate business reasons for
their decisions. 70 This distinction was initially made by the Board in
Wright Line ("Wright Line /,).71
The Wright Line test helps determine whether the General Counsel
has established a prima facie case that "[the employer's opposition to]

protected conduct was a 'motivating

factor'

in the employer's

[discharge] decision. 72 The NLRB will find that the General Counsel
has made a prima facie showing if the following elements are satisfied:

(1) "the employer had an impermissible motive of antiunion animus and
(2) the employer engaged in an activity covered by the NLRA, 73 "such
as discharging an employee for his union affiliation., 74 However, there
was not unanimity amongst the courts of appeals with this two-part
test.75 Further, it was acknowledged that there was distinction amongst

67. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 905 (1st Cir. 1981) (adopting the two-part test set
forth in the United States Supreme Court case Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)), superceded by statute, 5 U.S.C. §1221 (2000), as recognized in
Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1991) and Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
68. Pamela A. Howlett, "Salt" in the Wound? Making a Case and Formulating a Remedy
When an Employer Refuses to Hire Union Organizers,81 WASH. U. L.Q. 201, 208 (2003).
69. Id.; see, e.g., NLRB v. Interstate Builders, Inc., 351 F.3d 1020, 1035 (10th Cir. 2003)
(referring to type of case as "mixed-motive"); Howe, supra note 29, at 519 (referring to these type
of discrimination-based cases as "mixed or dual motives").
70. Wright Line (Wright Line 1), 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981); Howlett, supra note 68, at 208.
71. Wright Line 1, 251 N.L.R.B at 1084.
72. Wright Line 11, 662 F.2d at 901-02 (quoting the rule announced by the NLRB in Wright
Line 1, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089)).
73. Wright Line I, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089 (adopting the Mt. Healthy test).
74. Howlett, supra note 68, at 209 (footnotes omitted).
75. Id. at 211-12 (citing as examples of this disagreement NLRB v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161
F.3d 953, 967 (6th Cir. 1998) and Starcon, Inc. v. NLRB, 176 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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unlawful discharge versus failure to hire cased in that the violation is not
as obvious in the latter. 76 As a result, the NLRB reworked the initial test
in FES (a Division of Thermo Power),7 to make it "more specific to job
openings and applicants. '7 8
Under the modified test for failure to hire cases, the General
Counsel must now demonstrate the following in order to establish a
prima facie case:
(1) that the respondent was hiring, or had concrete plans to hire, at the
time of the alleged unlawful conduct; (2) that the applicants had
experience or training relevant to the announced or generally known
requirements of the positions for hire, or in the alternative, that the
employer has not adhered uniformly to such requirements, or that the
requirements where themselves pretextual or were applied as a pretext
for discrimination; and (3) that antiunion
animus contributed to the
79
decision not to hire the applicants.
The Wright Line test was only applicable to unlawful discharge
cases; however, the alteration, set forth in FES, expanded its application
to failure to hire cases. 80 The Board "ma[d]e[] the test more concrete by
requiring the Board's General Counsel to match at least one specific
applicant to a specific job opening.",81 Further, the Court addressed the
inherent difference in unlawful discharge versus hiring cases, namely
that the employer decisions in the hiring process can be hasty and are
more likely to be based on pretext.8 2 The presence of a ULP is more
clear-cut in the discharge cases, as employees are better able to ascertain
whether the employer's actions were based upon their union affiliation
as opposed to more legitimate grounds for discharge.83
When a failure to consider violation is alleged, the Wright Line test
can still be used with a slight variation in the elements.84 This test, like
the initial Wright Line test, only requires that two elements, as opposed
to three, be satisfied. The General Counsel must establish: "(1) that the

76. FES (a Division of Thermo Power) (FES), 331 N.L.R.B. 9, 24-25 (2000), aff'd, 301 F.3d
83 (3d Cir. 2002).
77. 331 N.L.R.B. 9 (2000).
78. Howlett, supra note 68, at 211-12.
79. FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 12 (footnotes omitted).
80. See Howlett, supra note 68, at 212.
81. Id.
82. FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 24.
83. See id. at 24-25.
84. Id.at 15.
85. Id.
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respondent excluded applicants from a hiring process; and (2) that
antiunion animus contributed
to the decision not to consider the
86
applicants for employment.,
After the General Counsel has made an argument as to these
elements for a failure to hire violation, the burden of proof shifts to the
respondent-employer to make a rebuttal.8 7 In essence, the employer is
required to establish that regardless of the applicant's affiliation with the
union, that individual would not have been hired. 8
Further, the
respondent must show: "(1) that improper motivations had no part in the
employment decision; or (2) that the same action would have been taken
regardless of (a) the employee's involvement in protected activities; or
(b) the employer's union animus." 89 For the failure to consider violation
the burden also then shifts to the employer "to show that it would not
have considered the applicants even in the absence of their union activity
or affiliation." 90 In both instances, this creates a hardship for the
respondent-employer who must in effect "prove a negative as an
affirmative defense." 9' This may motivate overt union salts to bring
unfair labor practice charges against employers who deny them
92
employment since the Wright Line test gives them the upper hand.
After both sides have presented their evidence, the Board must make a
determination as to whether a ULP has been committed by the
employer. 93 If the Board decides the employer's actions were
discriminatory, they generally must require the employer to remedy the
situation, provided that the infraction is not minor in nature or a simple
technicality.94

86. Id.
87. Howe, supra note 29, at 520. This rebuttal essentially operates as an affirmative defense.
Id.
88.

FES (a Division of Thermo Power) (FES), 331 N.L.R.B. 9, 12 (2000), aff'd, 301 F.3d 83

(3d Cir. 2002).
89. Howe, supra note 29, at 520.
90.

FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 15.

91.
92.
93.

Howe, supra note 29, at 520.
Id.
See Dickens, supranote 1,at 567.

94. 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 2071 (2007) [hereinafter Labor and Labor
Relations].
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HIRING DISCRIMINATION REMEDIES

A. Brief Overview of Remedies Issued by the NLRB
Any remedy issued by the NLRB for section 8(a)(3) violations
stemming from discriminatory hiring or discharge cases should serve the
purpose of making whole the injured party and "restor[ing] the part[y] to
the same status [he or she] enjoyed before the occurrence of unfair labor
practices and eliminate any imbalance created by the underlying
violations." 95 The remedy implemented in these types of discrimination
cases is commonly referred to as a "make-whole remedy., 96 The
objective is to remedy the discriminatory situation and not to punish the
employer with punitive damages.97 Despite discrepancies among the
circuit courts with regard to the remedy of cease-and-desist orders, the
NLRB in FES, in accordance with the Seventh Circuit, found that in
refusal to hire cases involving multiple applicants, a showing of
discrimination against one applicant was sufficient to warrant such an
order. 98
Where the Board finds an unlawful discrimination by an employer,
typically they will institute a remedy that is proportionate to the
violation. 99 Generally, in an unlawful discharge situation the remedy
will be a reinstatement order along with backpay and in certain
instances, a requirement to cease-and-desist from future discriminatory
conduct.100 In cases involving refusal to hire violations, the remedy is
the same as that which is awarded in the case of an unlawful discharge,
except the order mandates instatement rather than reinstatement, since
the applicants were never employed.10' In these types of cases, a
compliance proceeding will be conducted to evaluate whether those who
applied for the position would have been granted employment and to
determine how much backpay to award, in situations where the amount

95.
96.

Id.
FES (a Division of Thermo Power) (FES), 331 N.L.R.B. 9, 14 (2000), aff'd, 301 F.3d 83

(3d Cir. 2002).
97. Labor and Labor Relations, supra note 94. Common remedies granted by the NLRB for
ULPs rooted in discriminatory discharge or hiring include: reinstatement with backpay, hiring
(instatement) with backpay, and/or cease-and-desist orders. FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 14; Dickens,
supra note 1, at 567.
98. FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 14.
99. Howlett, supra note 68, at 226.
100. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 2750.
101. FES, 331 N.L.R.B. at 12.
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10 2
of job applicants is greater than job availability.
Unlike discriminatory discharge and refusal to hire cases, the
common remedy granted for refusal to consider a violation is a ceaseand-desist order.'0 3 Such an order will "requir[e] the employer to
consider the discriminatees for job openings based upon
nondiscriminatory criteria and an order requiring the employer to notify
the region, the discriminatees, and the charging party of future openings
in the same or substantially equivalent positions."' 0 4 Regardless of the
remedy, since this is not meant to be punitive, the NLRB will never
order a discriminatory employer to "provide a remedy for something
greater than the violation it committed."'0 5

B. Development of the Backpay Remedy
If backpay is granted, the NLRB formulates an award based on the
notion that this type of remedy serves the purpose of placing the
employee as closely as possible back in the position he or she would
have been in had the discrimination not occurred. 0 6 Backpay always
includes wages and in certain situations it can also encompass any of
following: "vacation benefits, bonuses, shares in profit-sharing
programs, pension coverage, health and medical coverage, employeeowned housing, employee discounts on purchases, car allowances,
overtime hours, meal allowances, employee stock ownership plans, tips,
and, where appropriate, moving
and traveling expenses incurred to
10 7
employment."'
alternative
obtain
In granting backpay, the Board must determine the period of time
from which to compute the compensation that will be awarded.'0 8 In
situations involving discriminatory hiring violations by employers,
"backpay is owed for the entire period between the [unlawful]

102.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 2751. As noted above, cease-and-desist

orders may be granted for these types of violations in cases involving numerous applicants upon a
showing of discrimination against a single applicant. FES, 331 N.L.R.B at 14.
103. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 2751.

104.
105.

Id.

106.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 2754-55.

Howlett, supra note 68, at 227.
In other words, the Board's

objective is to "make whole" the discriminatee. Id. at 2755.
107. Id. at 2754. In addition, the NLRB mandates that the employer pay the discriminatee
interest on the backpay. Id. at 2755 (footnotes omitted).
108. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1132 (2003) (discussing the
rebuttable presumption associated with determining the backpay period in discriminatory hiring or
discharge cases).
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discrimination and [the employers'] valid offer of reinstatement [or
instatement]."' 10 9 In Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 110 this presumption
was established by the NLRB to be rebuttable. 1 ' Furthermore, it was
set forth that the Board has great discretion to align the remedy with the
facts of each case in an effort to account for differences in severity of the
violation committed by the specific employer in question. 12 Finally, the
Board made it clear that the remedy granted cannot put the discriminatee
"in a better position than
he would have been in had the unfair labor
'1 13
practice not occurred."
Until recently, when the NLRB examined cases within the
construction industry, the rebuttable presumption for the backpay
remedy differed due to the nature of the industry.' 14 Construction jobs,
being of a shorter duration than other industries and having a completion
date, bring up the issue of whether an individual's employment ends on
that specific completion date or continues as they take on another
project.' 15 The Board typically applied the further presumption that the
construction employee's employment would not end upon the
completion of one specific job but rather the individual would be
transferred or given another assignment. 16 Therefore, the burden was
placed upon the employer to refute this presupposition by establishing
that the employee in this situation would not have continued in his or her
employment.1 17 If the employer was not successful in rebutting this
presumption, each discriminatee would be entitled to backpay and must
be offered a job.118
Despite this presumption of an indefinite employment period the
Board has considered factors while formulating the period of backpay
that reduced the amount of backpay awarded. 19 The NLRB could find
time frames within the backpay period that do not allow for an
109.

Id.

110.

340N.L.R.B.at1129.

11l.Id. This means that an employer was presented with the opportunity to counter or attempt
to mitigate the discriminatory allegations. Id.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
See Ferguson Elec. Co., 330 N.L.R.B. 514, 515 (2000).

115.

See id.; Dean Gen. Contractors, 285 N.L.R.B. 573, 573 (1987).

116.

Ferguson Elec. Co., 330 N.L.R.B. at 515; Dean Gen. Contractors, 285 N.L.R.B. at 573;

Note, supra note 7, at 1346.
117.

Ferguson Elec. Co., 330 N.L.R.B. at 515; Dean Gen. Contractors, 285 N.L.R.B. at 573;

Note, supra note 7, at 1346.
118.

Note, supra note 7, at 1346. This has held true even when the amount of individuals who

applied for jobs exceeded the number ofjob openings. Id.
119. See MATTHEW M. FRANCKIEWICZ, WINNNG AT THE NLRB 328 (BNA Books 1995).
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accumulation of backpay. 20 These gaps have been referred to as either
"excepted periods" or "excluded periods."' 2' The burden has generally
been on the respondent-employer to demonstrate the existence of such
"excepted periods. 122 Where the Board ultimately reversed the earlier
decision, this time frame
has been included for purposes of calculating
123
period.
backpay
the
Another consideration for the Board in computing the amount of
backpay to award a discriminatee may be interim earnings. 24 If a salt,
after being denied employment, then finds another job, the NLRB might
subtract any earnings that overlapped with the decided backpay period
when the Board determines how much to award that individual. 2 5
Stemming from the idea of interim earnings is the notion that essentially
the discriminatee has a duty to mitigate his or her damages. 26 This
could arguably be seen as an early attempt by the NLRB to make the
backpay period less damaging for employers.
This backpay calculation has often been criticized by both scholars
and the courts, from both sides of the spectrum. Some scholars have
condemned this remedy as not being strong enough and thus, employers
may be encouraged to violate the NLRA. 27 A more common criticism
seems to be that the presumption of an indefinite period of employment
in calculating the backpay award is too punitive, which is in direct
opposition to the make-whole purpose of the backpay remedy. 28 Thus,
the remedy is not "tailored to the actual consequences of
discrimination."'' 29 Another critique has been that it incorrectly places

120. Id.
121. Id. These gaps generally pertain to periods where the employee would not have generated
earnings despite the ULP, e.g., during a time where operation ceases due to vacation. Id. "Excepted
periods may also be based on factors unique to the particular employee, such as periods of illness or
other inability to work, as well as periods when the employee for personal reason was out of the
labor market." Id.
122. Id. at 333.
123.

THE DEVELOPtNG LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 2757.

124. Id.
125. See id. at 2758.
126. Id. In other words, the discriminated individual must make a reasonable attempt to seek
other employment. Id.
127. Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J.EMP. &
LAB. L. 223,234 (2005).
128. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitol 11),349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 2 (May
31, 2007); Poor & Boldt, supra note 14; Winston & Strawn, LLP Briefing, Labor and Employment

Practice,
Oil
Capitol
Sheet
Metal
Update,
June
2007,
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/il-Capital-Sheet-Metal-Update.pdf
Winston & Strawn].
129. Winston & Strawn, supra note 128.
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the burden on the employer to establish how long the salts may be
employed. 30 The argument is:
the respondent employer is in the best position to demonstrate that a
given job would have ended or a given employee would have been
terminated at some date certain for nondiscriminatory reasons, and any
uncertainty as to how long an applicant, if hired, would have worked
for a respondent employer is primarily a product of the respondent's
unlawful conduct. 131

It is possible that this argument and other criticisms are what
prompted the NLRB to make the groundbreaking evidentiary changes it
did in the recent decision in Oil Capitol II.
VI.

OIL CAPITOL SHEET METAL, INC.

A. FactualBackground
At the time of the incident in question, Michael Couch ("Couch")
had been operating as a union organizer for more than four years."' His
obligations encompassed unionizing workplaces that were not
represented and persuading companies without collective bargaining
contracts with unions to sign such agreements. 33 Couch stated that he
arrived at the respondent's place of business in February of 1998,
outfitted in union apparel in an effort to convince the Chairman of Oil
Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. ("Oil Capitol") to partake in a collective
bargaining agreement with his union.' 34 However, the company was not
receptive to such attempts. 35 During this time, Couch successfully
convinced some of the Oil Capitol's employees to leave the company

130. See Jake R. Fulcher, NLRB Ruling on Union "Salting" Gives Employers Relief THE
KDDK ADVANTAGE (Kahn, Dees, Donovan & Kahn, LLP, Evansville, Ind.) Aug. 2007, available
at http://www.kddk.com/newsletters/2007/aug07.html.
131. Oil Capitol11, 349 N.L.R.B., No. 118, slip op. at 1.
132. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitol 1), 17-CA-19714 (ALJ Jan. 3, 2000), reprinted
in Oil Capitol 11, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 18 (May 31, 2007). The NLRB attached the
ALJ's opinion subsequent to their decision. Id.; see also Peter Kok & Gregory Ripple, Less Salt in
the Wound: New Rules for Backpay in Salting Cases, MILLER JOHNSON, Oct. 5, 2007,
[hereinafter
http://www.millerjohnson.com/pubs/xprPubDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=l 577
Kok & Ripple] (discussing Couch's prior experience as a union organizer).
133. Oil Capitol1, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 18.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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36
and join a unionized employer.1
On May 5, 1998, Couch responded in person to an Oil Capitol
employment advertisement, wearing attire advocating his union
affiliation. 37 There he interacted with DeRycke, an individual whom he
38
knew had previously worked for a unionized company as an estimator.'
DeRycke asked him to demonstrate his ability to perform a specific
mechanical procedure in writing.' 39 Since Couch anticipated that an
incorrect response would cost him the employment, he sought
clarification of the assignment. 40 A resulting conversation indicated
that this type of written test was generally not given to job applicants by
the company during an interview.' 4' President John C. Odom (the
"President") of Oil Capitol, whom Couch claimed to have previously
met, confronted Couch about the questions he had failed to answer. 42
At that point Couch made clear his capabilities and willingness to
demonstrate them in any practical test necessary. 43 Couch alleged that
he was then accused by the President of harassment to which he
responded that he was only there to apply for employment. ' 44 Thus, the
claim brought on Couch's behalf was for failure to hire based on his
union affiliation, in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. 4 5
Michael London ("London") was also a union organizer who saw
Oil Capitol's employment advertisement.146 Upon inquiry, London
received indication from DeRycke that there was still job availability
and enthusiasm was expressed at the prospect of him coming to work
there. 147 DeRycke responded to London's statement that he could not
immediately come in for an interview with the implication that if he
came in for an interview based on his level of experience he would be
granted employment. 48 London eventually came to Oil Capitol and
during his meeting the President inquired from London as to whether the

136.
137.

Id.

Id.; see also Kok & Ripple, supra note 132 (discussing that Couch's primary objective
when he applied at Oil Capitol was to gain employment in order to unionize).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Oil Capitol1, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 18.

Id.
Id.
Id.,slipop. at 18,21.
Id.,slipop. at 18-19.

Id., slip op. at 19.
Id.
Id., slip op. at 21.
Id., slip op. at 19.
Id.

Id.
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contractor, Liberty Sheet Metal, was a union company. 149 Unlike
Couch, London did not arrive at Oil Capitol wearing union apparel, nor
did he reveal his union affiliation.150 Further, he was never asked to
respond to the types of questions that Couch had demonstrated resistance
to during his interview.15 1 London was hired, thus the grounds for the
allegations were not failure to hire or even failure to consider, but rather
were made on the basis of the purported unlawful interrogation
as to his
15
previous place of employment being union affiliated. 1
The Company President, John C. Odom, painted a completely
different image of the events that transpired between his company and
Couch. Despite the potential implications of his interaction with both
alleged discriminatees, the President described himself as union
friendly. 53 To counter the allegations, the President claimed that despite
not having a union contract at the time, he had no bias against union
members since he believed workers with a union affiliation tended to be
better trained and more skilled than their nonunion counterparts. 54 As
opposed to what Couch perceived to be anti-union animus, the President
justified his request for Couch to complete the written test based on his
necessity for an employee to perform this function out in the field. 55 He
described his encounter with Couch as being very tense and caused him
at times to feel threatened due to Couch's aggressive mannerisms and
his refusal to answer the written questions. 56 As to his interaction with
London, the President stated that they had an agreeable encounter
and he
57
hired London based on his merits as a sheet metal worker.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. ld., slip op. at 21.
153. Id., slip op. at 19. He stated that he had implemented contractual agreements with unions,
which lasted for an extended period of time. Id.
154. Id. The President expressed his belief that some of the skills union workers possess could
not be developed from training in technical schools. Id.
155. Id., slip op. at 19-20. An assertion made by the company in its defense is that this test, in
actuality, put Couch in a better position than most interviewees in that it provided him with the
opportunity to formulate answers to questions he would have otherwise had to respond to
spontaneously during an interview. Id., slip op. at 21.
156. Id., slip op. at 20. The company used this confrontational situation to support its
argument that it had not exhibited discrimination against union members during the hiring process,
but rather had a valid reason for not hiring this specific individual. Id.
157. Id.
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B. The Administrative Law Judge'sDecision

1. Initial Determination
In response to a claim brought by the regional director of the Board,
the administrative law judge ("ALJ") evaluated the merits of the case
based on the facts at hand. 158 His determination that there was employer
conduct in violation of section 8(a)(3) involved four components. 159
Before discussing each of these in detail, the ALJ made an initial
credibility determination based on the testimony of both parties. 160 As a
whole, the ALJ was suspicious of much of the President's testimony
with regard to his actions and his perception61of the encounter that took
place between himself and applicant Couch.'
The ALJ evaluated each element in turn. First, the ALJ determined
that the employer in question, Oil Capitol, was undoubtedly covered by
the NLRA. 162 Next, the AU found that Oil Capitol was unquestionably
hiring employees or at a minimum intended to do so at the time when
Couch came into the company seeking employment. 163 Third, the ALJ
concluded the respondent-employer had clearly demonstrated anti-union
animus during the hiring process. 64 The ALJ felt that despite the
President's testimony to the contrary, he had knowledge of Couch's
status as a union organizer from the previous encounter that Couch
alleged occurred in early 1998.165 The anti-union animus was further
evidenced by the unprecedented written requirement that Couch was
asked to complete during his interview. 66 The situation with London
also exemplified the company's anti-union sentiment in that he was
interrogated as to whether one of his previous employer's was a

158.
159.

Id., slip op. at 18.
Id., slip op. at 22-23.

160. Id., slip op. at 22.
161.

Id., slip op. at 22-23.

One aspect of the President's testimony that the AU

found

particularly unconvincing was the President's statement that training of the caliber the union
provided was not available from technical schools. Id., slip op. at 22.
162.
163.

Id., slip op. at 23.
Id. This finding was evidenced by the fact that Oil Capitol's records showed that job

applicants were hired both before and after the incident with Couch. Id.
164. Id.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. Further, the AU found that the company took advantage of Couch's attempts to seek

further explanation of the task at hand, using it as a basis for immediately concluding the interview.
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unionized company.
Finally, the hiring of London, a covert union
organizer, and not Couch, an overt organizer, confirmed Oil Capitol's
68
blatant discrimination towards individuals with union affiliation.
The final determination made by the ALJ was that based on his
qualifications and skill, Couch was indisputably a valid job applicant,
despite his position as a paid union salt.' 69 Thus, Couch was entitled to
the full protection by the NLRA. 70 The company was not able to
counter the evidence presented by showing that Couch would not have
been granted employment "even in the absence of any protected conduct
on his part.'171 The ALJ concluded from this analysis that Oil Capitol
had committed an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(1)
and (3) the NLRA.' 72
To remedy their unfair labor practice, the ALJ held that it would be
appropriate to mandate that Oil Capitol cease and desist as well as take
measures to bring itself into compliance with the policies set forth by the
NLRA. 173 Since it had been found that Oil Capitol had acted in a
discriminatory manner when it refused to hire Couch after his interview,
the ALJ further held it must evaluate his job qualifications and
compensate him with appropriate backpay.174
2. Supplemental Opinion Subsequent to FES
In a supplemental decision on July 31, 2000, after the Board
remanded the case back to him for reevaluation given the NLRB's
decision in FES, the ALJ reaffirmed his earlier rulings.' 7 5 Based upon
FES, the ALJ established both that: (1) positions were available at the
time of the purported discriminatory conduct as supported by his earlier
findings that the company was taking affirmative actions to recruit job
167. Id. London's interview further demonstrated anti-union animus where he was explicitly
told by one of the company's employees that Oil Capitol was not represented by a union when he
inquired as to whether the company was hiring. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. This is evidenced by the fact that London, the covert union organizer, was hired. Id.
172. See id., slip op. at 21, 23.
173. Id., slip op. at23.
174. Id. Additionally, the AU attached a Notice for the employer to post at the jobsite setting
forth employee's collective bargaining rights and impermissible conduct from which Oil Capitol
must now refrain. Id.
175. Id., slip op. at 23, 25. This occurred after "[r]espondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering briefs, and the Respondent filed a
reply brief." Id., slip op. at 1.
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applicants, and (2) Couch possessed the appropriate background
required for the available job and in fact the employer deviated from the
standards set forth in the job description or applied such standard in a
discriminatory fashion. 176 Thus, the AU reaffirmed his original bench
decision establishing that the employer had committed a 1refusal
to hire
77
violation in accordance with the new test set forth in FES.
3. The NLRB's Decision
Following this supplemental decision issued by AU Cates,
Respondent submitted exceptions in conjunction with a brief in support
thereof and the NLRB reheard the case considering these exceptions. 78
The NLRB agreed with the AU that Oil Capitol's discriminatory failure
to hire Couch constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA. 179 Specifically, that the General Counsel had made out a
prima facie case in accordance with the new test set forth in FES. 80
Further, the Respondent did not successfully refute these allegations by
showing that Couch would have been denied employment regardless of
his union connections. 8'
The Board reversed the portion of the AU decision pertaining to
London, where the AU found that the employer had unlawfully
interrogated London by asking him whether a previous employer was
unionized and thus, had committed a section 8(a)(1) violation.' 8 2 The
NLRB concluded this determination was incorrect as there was no
implicit connotation that an affirmative answer to the posed question
would negatively impact their hiring decision, nor did it indicate an
antiunion sentiment.183 Additionally, the Board found that the statement
made by DeRycke that Oil Capitol was a nonunion employer was a
factual rather than a coercive statement; thus, it did not suggest anti176.
177.

Id., slip op. at 24-25.
Id., slip op. at 25. The AU determined that the proper terminology for part of the remedy

to be imposed for a failure to hire violation is "instatement" as opposed to "reinstatement" which
was the term he had originally used in his earlier bench decision. Id.
178. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitol 11), 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at I (May

31, 2007).
179. Id. With respect to the AL's findings regarding Michael Couch, the Board found that the
ALJ had erred by affirming as opposed to amending his conclusions of law, remedy, and order. Id.,

slip op. at 3. In doing so, he reserved the issue of the employer's refusal to hire for a compliance
proceeding, which the Board deemed superfluous. Id.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id., slip op. at 3.
Id.
Id., slip op. at 8.
Id.
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union animus.184
The groundbreaking nature of this decision stemmed from the fact
that the Board, on its own initiative, addressed whether there should be a
change in the longstanding tradition of providing discriminatees with
backpay based upon a presumption of indefinite employment.'8 5 The
186
NLRB treated this as the primary issue for consideration in this case.
Specifically, it evaluated whether a salt is entitled to the application of a
rebuttable presumption with respect to the backpay period.187 A
distinction was made between union salts and typical job applicants with
respect to each individual's goals of obtaining the position and the
desired duration of the employment. 88 The Board set forth the terms of
the evidentiary requirement the General Counsel must meet, holding that
there could no longer be a reliance on the presumption to satisfy their
burden of proof with respect to the backpay period warranted.' 89 Part of
their determination was based upon the notion that prior to this decision,
the burden was misplaced upon the respondent employer who was not in
as good of a position as the General Counsel to produce evidence
regarding the presumed duration of an individual's employment. 190
Many ramifications resulted from the Board's consideration of this
issue and the way in which their decision altered backpay
determinations. Most importantly, the Board will now no longer apply
the traditional presumption if the discriminatee in question is acting as a

184. Id., slip op. at 9.
185. Id., slip op. at 1. The Board reasoned that despite the dissent's argument in the
alternative, it falls within the Board's independent power to raise issues resulting in the imposition
of a remedy that they see fit. Id., slip op. at 6. Specifically, the majority disagreed with the fact that
the parties did not challenge this remedy prevented them from raising it themselves. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.; see also NLRB Adopts New Evidentiary Standardfor Establishing "Salt" Backpay
Period, LEGAL UPDATES (Jackson Lewis, White Plains, N.Y.), June 12, 2007,
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/articleprint.cfm?aid= 1139 [hereinafter New Evidentiary
Standard] (highlighting that the interim goal of the union salt would impact the Board's
consideration of this issue).
188. Oil Capitol 11,
349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 2. The NLRB alluded to the fact that
typically a salt that is hired with the sole purpose of unionizing will continue or plan to continue
only as long as the goal remains or until it is fulfilled. Id.; see also Michael R. Lied, NLRB Changes
Damages Presumptions When Employer Refuses to Hire Paid Union Organizers, (Howard &
Howard Peoria, 111),
June 28, 2007 (discussing that union salts are usually seeking only "limited
engagement" unlike the average applicant).
189. Oil Capitol II, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 1-2. The removal of the presumption
was based upon the Board's decision that it was too speculative in nature and not applicable to this
class of alleged discriminatees. Id., slip op. at 2.
190. Id.; see also Poor & Boldt, supra note 14 (supporting the idea that this burden has
historically been mislaid).
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paid union organizer. 1 The Board, in effect, created a novel obligation
for the General Counsel with respect to the evidence that must be
presented to support the amount of backpay based upon what would
have been the anticipated term of employment had the individual
actually been hired by the respondent employer.1 92 The evidence that
must be presented must be affirmative in nature. 193 The Board provided
a list of non-exhaustive evidence that could be submitted by the General
Counsel including the following:
[T]he salt/discriminatees personal circumstances, contemporaneous
union policies and practices with respect to salting campaigns, specific
plans for the targeted employer, instructions or agreements between
the salt/discriminatee and union concerning the anticipated duration of
the assignment, and historical data regarding the duration of
employment of the salt/discriminatee and other salts in similar salting
campaigns.194
Furthermore, with respect to construction projects, the presumption
of transfer to other sites upon job completion will also no longer be
accepted as sufficient on face value.1 95 There will need to be an
affirmative showing with evidence that a transfer to a new jobsite would
by that individual employee if he or she had
be welcomed and accepted
196
initially been hired.
This case sets important precedent for similar cases that will be
presented to the Board down the line. The new standard of evidentiary
proof for the General Counsel will be required by the Board in cases
involving either a failure to hire or an unlawful discharge of a union
salt. 197 The Board anticipated that its decision would affect the remedy
of instatement/reinstatement in that if the General Counsel failed to meet

191. Oil Capitol11, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 2. The Board partly relied on Aneco v.
NLRB, 285 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2002), in making this determination. Ross' Employment Law Blog:

Backpay
Calculating
NLRB:
http://www.lawmemo.com/blog2007/06/nlrb-calculatin.html

Salters,
for
(June 5, 2007) [hereinafter Ross'

Employment Law Blog]. In Aneco, the court held that the Board improperly assumed that the paid

union organizer would have been employed by the respondent for a specific period of time. Id.
192.

Oil CapitolII, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 2; see also Poor & Boldt, supra note 14

(emphasizing that the NLRB's decision places the burden of establishing damages indirectly on the
union by making it the obligation of the General Counsel to make such a demonstration).
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Oil Capitoll, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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their burden, such a remedy would not be permitted for the salt.' 98
Although the Board's decision will have an impact on the burden of
proof in various types of salting cases, this effect will not carry over to
cases not involving union salts. 199

4. The Dissent
Despite the unanimity of the Board with respect to the failure to
hire violation by Oil Capitol of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA,
there was avid disagreement regarding the section 8(a)(1) violation and,
more significantly, the remedy issue raised by the Board in this case.220°02
20 1
and Dennis P. Walsh
Specifically, Members Wilma B. Liebman
disagreed with the Board's decision to act on its own initiative when it
raised the issue with respect to backpay period duration, which led to the
eventual overturning of strong precedent.20 3 The dissenting members
felt that the Board overstepped its bounds when they decided to examine
an aspect of the law that had not been questioned by either of the parties
in this case.20 4 They disagreed with the majority's theory that a new
policy choice with respect to the evidence requirement in these
employment discrimination cases was warranted.20 5
Further, the
dissenting members disagreed that a distinction should be made between
salts and other employee plaintiffs who claim they have suffered from
discrimination. 206 They reasoned that since backpay is only awarded
after the employer is found to be at fault, it seemed fitting to resolve any

198. Id.
199. NLRB Changes Standard,supra note 25.
200. Oil Capitol II, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 10 n.1 (Liebman, M. & Walsh, M.,
dissenting); Ross' Employment Law Blog, supra note 191.
201. Wilma B. Liebman was designated Chairman of the NLRB by President Barack Obama
on January 20, 2009. This Note refers to her title at the time of the decision in Oil Capitol.
202. Scholars emphasized that it came as no shock that these members would find fault in the
majority's new approach to calculating backpay periods in cases involving union salts. NLRB
Changes Standard,supranote 25.
203. Ross' Employment Law Blog, supra note 191. The dissenters noted that this precedent
had been followed previously by appellate courts on two separate occasions and, more substantially,
never been rejected. Id.
204. Oil Capitol I, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at II (finding the new approach taken by
the majority to be unfounded in both a factual and legal sense); NLRB Changes Standard,supra
note 25 (stressing that the Board had raised this issue without it having it been briefed by either of
the parties and further without "any sound legal or empirical basis").
205. Oil Capitol11, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 1l.
206. NLRB Changes Standard,supra note 25 (describing the dissenting opinion's view that
salts should continue to receive the same treatment as non-salts in discrimination cases with respect
to backpay awards); Ross' Employment Law Blog, supra note 191.
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discrepancy as to the facts alleged against that employer.20 7
Members Liebman and Walsh took issue with three aspects of the
majority's new evidentiary requirement.20 8
First, they found it
problematic that the majority neglected to set forth explicit standards to
be used in establishing whether or not a discriminatee is in fact a union
salt.20 9 In other words, in every case the issue of whether an individual
discriminatee is a salt or not will arise and thus, have to be litigated.
Second, a lack of a distinction between voluntary salts and those who
receive compensation for their union organizing efforts was found to be
a cause for concern. 2 1 Finally, they found the Board erred when they
addressed the issue of whether salts must receive instatement 21or
reinstatement as this was outside of the scope of the backpay issue. '
The dissenters also took issue with how the majority extended their
holding beyond the question of backpay in failure to hire cases, to
unlawful termination cases since the latter present issues of greater
severity and do not necessarily warrant the same remedy.2 12
As the dissenters recognized in concluding their opinion, it can be
argued that the majority has flouted traditional NLRA policy by
overstepping the bounds of their role as rule constructionists by creating
new arbitrary rules.213 It is rare for the NLRB to exercise rulemaking
authority and when it does in fact do so, it has generally been limited to
situations where they found it necessary to establish parameters for
representation elections.21 4 The Supreme Court has made clear that
although rulemaking can be permissible in policy determinations, the
Board may not abuse their discretion in doing so. 2 15 The majority's
holding in Oil Capitol II is arguably such an abuse of discretion, as
supported by the lack of legal and factual support for the removal of the
longstanding presumption of indefinite backpay. This decision has
hastily invalidated what has been seen as established case law, which has
207.
208.

NLRB Changes Standard,supra note 25.
Oil Capitol 11, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 14 (Liebman, M. & Walsh, M.,

dissenting).
209. Id.
210. Id. They pointed out that since paid and unpaid salts may be treated differently by the
union, it was an error for the NLRB to overlook this distinction. Id., slip op. at 15.
211. Id., slip op. at 14.
212. Id., slip op. at 15. Noting that the level of coercion in unlawful discharge cases would
likely be greater than in failure to hire cases due to the possibility that other employees will be privy
to this occurrence. Id.
213. Id.
214. THEODORE J. ST. ANTOtNE ET. AL, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 38
(1 th ed. 2005).

215.

Id. at 39.
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been consistently upheld by the NLRB in past decisions and as such,
contravenes the adversarial practice of stare decisis. 2 16 Furthermore, this
holding can be criticized as stemming from a societal distaste for the
unionizing method of salting that has been developing since the tactic's
favorable treatment in Town & Country Electric, Co. 217 It was improper
for the Board to retract from its prior recognition that this tactic was in
fact protected under the NLRA as a valid collective bargaining
practice. 21 8 As the dissent plainly recognized, the Board should not be
"endors[ing] what amounts to the Board's own discrimination against
salts. 2 19
VII. OIL CAPITOL, A VEHICLE FOR DISCRIMINATION?

If one thing is clear from the majority's holding in Oil CapitolII, it
is that the employer may now be more inclined to discriminate against
union salts in terms of hiring. This ruling arguably facilitates the ease
with which employers may filter out applicants whom they believe are
not truly prospective employees due to their union affiliation. Further,
this has sparked the Board to continually decide cases in a more
employer friendly manner, effectively counteracting much of the
advancement workers have gained since the Board's decision in Town &
Country Electric, Co., to include salts in the definition of employee in
the NLRA.
Recently, Wilma B. Liebman, one of the dissenters in Oil Capitol
II, made a statement before employment-related subcommittees in the
House of Representatives and the Senate regarding the impact of recent
decisions on workers' rights. 220 A major issue she addressed was the
current trend of Board decisions moving away from well-established
216. See Oil Capitol I, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 15 (Liebman, M. & Walsh, M.,
dissenting).
217. Id. (discussing that since the Board's decision in Town & Country Electric, Co., this
practice has experienced widespread success as a technique of union organization).
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Wilma B. Liebman, Member, NLRB, The National Labor Relation's Board: Recent
Decisions and Their Impact on Workers' Rights, Statement Before the Subcommittee on
Employment and Workplace Safety, Committee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the
United States Senate, and the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions,
Committee on Education and Labor of the United States House of Representatives 1 (Dec. 13, 2007)
(transcript available online with the House at the website for the Committee on Education of the
House
of
Representatives),
available
at
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/121307WilmaLiebmanTestimony.pdf
[hereinafter
Liebman
Statement].
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principles of law.221 One principle being that "uncertainties are to be
resolved against the wrongdoer: here, the employer who engaged in
unlawful discrimination. 222 This principle was prudently manufactured
into the test set forth by the Board's decision in FES, for determining
whether a failure to hire violation existed. 223 Any uncertainties with
respect to whether an employer had committed such a violation were
decided in favor of the union salt.224 She addressed that Oil Capitol II
contravenes this longstanding tenet of labor and employment law.225
Liebman drew attention to her dissenting opinion in which her and
Member Walsh criticized the majority's holding as "fundamentally
unfair" as it regarded
union salts as "a uniquely disfavored class of
226
discriminatees."

Liebman further addressed that the NLRB explored and ruled on
issues that were not raised by the parties to the suit in Oil CapitolIHand
other subsequent decisions.22 7 She found it to be troubling and arguably
an abuse of power that the Board was establishing a new trend of ruling
on issues with established precedential value by acting without prompt
and without soliciting briefs from the parties. 2 Even more disturbing
was the fact that the Board's justifications for doing so were
unsupported.229

Member Liebman analogized the fluctuation in decision making of
the NLRB seen as a new Administration takes office, which in effect
changes the Board's composition by appointing new members, to a
playground see-saw. 230 Her argument centered on the fact that the Bushappointed Board departed from the pattern set forth by the Board
appointed during the Clinton Administration was by no means
unanticipated.2 31 It was especially notable that the current Board has

221. Id. at 13.
222. Id. at 13-14.
223. Id. at 13.
224. See id. at 13-14.
225. Id. at 13. The evidentiary burden established in Oil Capitol makes it such that any
discrepancies will be resolved against the discriminatee-salt. See id.
226. Id. at 14 (citing Oil Capitol II, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 10 (May 31, 2007)).
227. Id. at 5, 13.

228. Id. at 5.
229. Id. at 5-6.
230. Id. at 5. Her analogy was made in order to demonstrate the profound impact that political
change has on the composition of the Board and, as a result, the decision making process as well.
See id. She emphasized that the recent decisions were especially problematic in this sense and
constituted what she terms a "sea change," since the present NLRB arguably departs in a substantial
manner from the underlying policies and ideals surrounding the NLRA. Id.
231. Id.
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been reversing past decisions that had been continually reaffirmed not
only by the Clinton Administration but also numerous preceding
Boards.2 32 The impact of this new tendency has caused an uproar among
unhappy litigants who feel slighted by the loss of protection that was
once provided under the NLRA as well as scholars in the field of labor
and employment law. 233 The long-term effect has been a continual
decline in the NLRB's caseload due to distrust and loss of faith in this
system by would-be litigants in labor and employment-related
disputes.234 In shying away from bringing cases before the NLRB, labor
unions have redirected their focus to their state and local governments
for obtaining relief in failure to hire and other unfair labor practice
allegations against employers.23 5
Another fault of the current NLRB, which is evidenced by both Oil
Capitol II and other recent decisions, is its failure to properly utilize
remedies laid out in the NLRA for unfair labor practice cases. 236 The

alteration in how the remedy granted to discriminatees will be
calculated, as set forth in Oil CapitolII, will arguably now have less of a
deterrent effect on employers in terms of discriminating against union
salts in both hiring and discharge.2 37 A prominent scholar articulated his
view that remedies imposed by the NLRB have habitually been of the
"slap-on-the-wrist variety," even prior to this change in Oil Capitol11. 238
However, now with this ruling, employers might be more willing to take
the hit of paying a small backpay remedy in exchange for being able to
rid themselves of a pesky union salt. 239 The harsh reality of this case is
that the potential for increased discrimination by employers is inevitable.
VIII.

OIL CAPITOL'S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S
INVESTIGATIVE AND LITIGATION STRATEGIES

Subsequent to the Board's groundbreaking decision in Oil Capitol

232. Id. She felt this Board was unique for this reason, as no past Board had blatantly
disregarded such established precedent in this manner. See discussion regarding the Board ruling on
its own initiative supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
233. Liebman Statement, supra note 220, at 6.
234. Id. Member Liebman provided statistics, which illuminate this recent decline. Id. at 6
n.5.

235.
236.
237.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 28; Liebman, supranote 16, at 585.
This could potentially be seen as an impediment in the calculation of backpay awards.

Liebman, supra note 16, at 585 n. 116.
238. NLRB Changes Standard, supra note 25.

239.

See id.
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II, it was initially unclear to the General Counsel as to how they would
meet this new evidentiary burden. 240 As such, they put decisions in
which the Oil Capitol II framework would apply on hold until a proper
consensus could be reached on how to proceed with such cases.24 1
Finally, in February 2008, the Assistant General Counsel released a
memorandum to all NLRB Regional Offices establishing the new
framework to be used at both the investigatory and litigation stages of
cases involving the issue of unfair labor practices involving union
salts.242 This proof structure would displace any previous instructive
orders that would have applied in such cases. 4 3
The memorandum advised all regional offices of the substantial
impact of the Oil Capitol II decision on the pursuance of such cases, in
terms of the alteration in burden of proof and the evidence that will have
to be produced.244 In deciding on how to go forward with a case, if at
all, it is crucial to first determine whether or not the alleged
discriminatee is purported to be a salt, as this will impact the type of
evidence that must be adduced. 4 5 It is possible that having to make
such a determination before proceeding will discourage the General
Counsel from bringing the case at all. Additionally, it was suggested
that the Regional Directors should focus, amongst other things, on the
factors laid out by the NLRB in Oil Capitol II when establishing the
duration of a backpay period. 46
The memorandum discussed Jeffs Electric, LLC,247 a recent case, in
which the Oil Capitol II proof structure was applied and in which an
AU found that the General Counsel had properly met their evidentiary
burden.2 48 The General Counsel produced evidence that satisfied the
aforementioned factors, for example,

240. See Memorandum from Richard A. Siegel, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of the Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd. Office of the Gen. Counsel on Case Handling Instructions for Cases Involving Oil
CapitolSheet Metal to all Reg'l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum 08-

29(CH) I & n.2 (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.nlrb.gov (search "Search: OM Memos" for
"08-29(CH)"; then follow "OM 08-29(CH)" hyperlink).
241. Id. at I n.2.

242. Id.at 1.
243. Id.
244. Id.at 2.
245.

Id. at 3-4.

This determination is vital because this new evidentiary burden applied in

salting cases involves a computation based upon whether the discriminatee would have worked for
the entire period alleged in the backpay claim. Id. at 4.
246.
247.

Id. at 5; see supra note 192 and accompanying text.
34-CA-1 1371, 11398 (ALJ Sept. 17, 2007).

248.

Memorandum from Richard A. Siegel, supra note 240, at 6.
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[A]ffirmative evidence of the six discriminatees' personal
circumstances during the backpay period, e.g., when they began
working for respondent, they were unemployed, in the bottom-half of
the union's out-of-work list, and were not expected to be referred to a
union contractor for at249least six months because of severe
unemployment at the time.

This case exemplified the type of affirmative evidence needed to satisfy
the burden.25 °
Further, this memorandum discussed the potential effects on cases
still pending at the litigation stage. 25 i The Associate General Counsel
indicated that there could possibly be retroactive effects on cases that are
still in the decision process.252 Specifically, an instruction was provided
on how to avoid re-litigation of matters already decided in favor of the
General Counsel, with respect to the evidentiary burden as set forth in
Furthermore, he addressed potential negative
Oil Capitol 11.253
ramifications of applying this new model to cases that were initiated
prior to this decision.254 A major concern being that necessary evidence
might be misplaced or inaccessible at this point in the litigation.255 A
suggested method for avoiding such retroactivity of this proof structure
was to analyze the case to see whether such an application would result
in a "manifest injustice to the discriminatees in the case. 256 As cases
are decided in the wake of the Oil Capitol II decision, the hope is that a
more concrete method of analysis will be developed, to minimize any
potential negative ramifications.
IX. OIL CAPITOL PROGENY

Oil Capitol II was not the only employer-friendly decision handed
down by the current NLRB. Subsequent cases provided employers with
even more leeway to refuse employment to certain types of union salts.
A distinction must be made between union organizers who legitimately
seek to be employed so that they can later organize the company from

249. Id. (citing Jeffs Electric LLC, 34-CA-11371, 11398, slip op. at 8 (May 12, 2006)).
250. Id.

251. Id. at 7-8.
252. Id. at 8.
253.

Id.

Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
256. Id. at 8-10. If the regional office concludes that this would in fact be the result, they
should go forward in preparing a Motion for Reconsideration. Id. at 10.
254.
255.
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within, and those who apply for employment anticipating to be denied so

that they can file an unfair labor practice charge against that employer.2 57
The Board has begun to focus on this difference and is proactively trying
to remedy this situation.
A. Toering Electric Company
Previous Board decisions seemed to indicate that all job
applicants-whether salts or not-would be considered covered
employees under section 2(3) of the NLRA.258 However, in Toering
Electric Co., 25 9 the NLRB emphasized that not all job applicants will
receive protection under section 2(3) of the NLRA.26 ° Once again the
Board acted on its own initiative and considered the novel issue of

whether an authentic desire to gain employment was a necessary factor
in determining whether an individual is a covered employee and thus
entitled to protection.261 The Board found that this was a key component
and as such, individuals lacking a genuine interest in obtaining
employment would not be entitled to protection. 262 Further, applying for

a job to spark unfounded charges against an employer will not be
considered protected activity under section 7 of the NLRA. 263

The

257. See discussion on overt versus covert salts, supra Part IL.B (discussing that some salts
purposely disclose their union affiliation for late litigation purposes).
258. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitol 11), 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 3 (May
31, 2007); see, e.g., Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1995); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1941).
259. 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (Sept. 29, 2007).
260. Id., slip op. at 1, 4. In Toering, eighteen union-affiliated job applicants were denied
employment when the union submitted their resumes. Id., slip op. at 2. It was argued by the
respondent-employer, that these individuals were acting as union salts for the Union, Local Union
No. 275, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
Additionally, it was argued that these applicants were not genuinely attempting to obtain
employment with Toering Electric Co. and thus, should not be protected under the NLRA. Id., slip
op. at 2.
261. Id., slip op. at 14 (dissenting opinion); Bush Board Has Been Busy: Protection Eliminated
for Salts Not "Genuinely Interested" in Securing Employment, CROSS, GUNTER, WITHERSPOON &
GALCHUS E-NEWSLETTER (Cross, Gunter, Witherspoon & Galchus, Little Rock, Ark.), Nov. 2007,
http://www.cgwg.com/enews/view.asp?id=40 [hereinafter Bush Board Has Been Busy].
262. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 4. Thus, the Board concluded that
these eighteen individuals would not be considered covered employees since evidence was lacking
that they were legitimately seeking employment. Id., slip op. at 10. The evidence instead revealed
their motive was solely to initiate litigation with the respondent; however, they would have the
opportunity to present contrary evidence on remand. Id.
263. Id., slip op. at 6-7; see also Workplace Prof Blog: The NLRB Cuts Back on Salt(ing),
htp://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2007ll 0/the-nlrb-cuts-b.html
(Oct.
4, 2007)
[hereinafter NLRB Cuts Back] (emphasizing that the majority focused on those applicants seeking
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Board narrowed the definition of "employee" found in section 2(3),
which was once thought to encompass "any employee. ' '26 It will now
be considered an aspect of the General Counsel's burden to establish that
a salt should be covered as an employee.26 5
1. Practical Implications of the Toering Decision
This decision is significant, not only because it limits the scope of
coverage of the NLRA, but also in that it represents the Board taking
another step away from employee-favored interpretations of the NLRA.
Further, it is seen by some labor law professionals as being "potentially
a major victory for nonunion employers who are targets of salting
campaigns and could alleviate the extreme litigation costs and disruption
associated with such campaigns., 2 66 Employers now have another tool
to utilize when seeking to deny employment to those individuals who
appear to not have a legitimate interest in working for their company.
The denial of employment will no longer necessarily be seen as a ULP,
rather it will now be more likely to be seen as a valid act supported by
case law.
This decision seems to reflect the developing trend in NLRB
decisions to make it more difficult for unions to organize workplaces
through salting. Toering, like Oil CapitolII, removes what was once an
automatic presumption, namely that a salt would be an "employee"
covered under section 2(3) of the NLRA. This is clearly a favorable
ruling for employers as it will enable them to avoid being forced to
employ a person lacking a legitimate interest in holding that job, solely
out of fear of a charge of discrimination. In contrast, this decision may
have negative implications for unions, in that employers may be more
inclined to act in a manner that would constitute ULPs since the deck is
essentially stacked against the union with respect to salting. 267 If
employers were not already encouraged by the higher evidentiary

to incite litigation by applying for positions without any true desire for employment).
264. ToeringElec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 3-4.
265. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 9; see also Bush Board Has Been
Busy, supra note 261 (discussing the General Counsel's burden of proof with respect to job
applicants); NLRB Cuts Back, supra note 263. (noting the General Counsel's obligation to establish
that that applicant had a "genuine interest"). The Board found such a showing necessary to
implement NLRA policies and procedures. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 1.
266. Bush Board Has Been Busy, supra note 261.
267. See Liebman Statement, supra note 220, at 14. This statement argued that due to the
obscure holding about covered employees, employers were essentially "free to discriminate against
union salts, unless it could be proved that the salts were genuinely interested in employment."
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standard created in Oil Capitol II, this decision will certainly lead them
in this direction.
2. Dissent and Scholarly Criticism
Some scholars argue that the NLRB went too far in this decision,
not only in overturning long-standing precedent but also by creating a
blanket exclusion of such individuals from the protection of the
NLRA.2 68 Much of the argument stems from the fact that the Board
once again considered an important issue "[w]ithout the benefit of briefs,
oral argument, or even a request to reconsider precedent. 2 69 The dissent
also took issue with the fact that the majority seemed to go against the
very core of the NLRA as well as long-standing case law. 270 The dissent
found fault in the majority's reasoning that all salts will inherently act in
a disloyal manner because of their attempt to unionize. 71 More
specifically, it was problematic that the Board created an absolute
presumption with respect to salts as a whole, where such determinations
should more properly be made on an individual fact-specific basis.272
The dissent argued that the Board inaccurately placed its focus on
the attempt by some salts to incite litigation, rather than on the
discriminatory decisions made by employers.273 Additionally, the
General Counsel was arguably left without any instruction on how to
fulfill their new burden of establishing that a salt is a bona fide
applicant.274 Unlike the contrary views of some practitioners, the dissent
believed these new guidelines would increase litigation costs for reasons
such as a greater likelihood that the "genuineness issue" will be litigated
by employers seeking to defend their actions in denying such applicants

268. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 14 (dissenting opinion); NLRB Cuts
Back, supra note 263. Amongst those who disagreed with the majority's opinion were Wilma B.
Liebman and Dennis P. Walsh, the dissenting members of Oil Capitol, finding similar faults with
the Board's holding in this more recent case. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 14

(dissenting opinion).
269.
270.

Id. (dissenting opinion).
Id. The dissent felt that this decision reinforced the notion that the period in which the

Board recognized the validity of union salting as an appropriate organizing technique, irrespective
of the salter's motive, appeared to be drawing to a close. Id.
271. Id., slip op. at 16. The dissent also found fault in the following two aspects of the
majority's argument: (1)claims by union salts against an employer for ULPs are by their nature
lacking in merit, and (2) the proof structure set forth in FES does not sufficiently protect against
unfounded litigation brought against employers by salts. Id.
272. NLRB Cuts Back, supra note 263.
273. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 18 (dissenting opinion).

274. Id., slip op. at 20.
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employment .2211
B. St. George Warehouse
St. George Warehouse,276 a decision handed down the day after the
NLRB made its determination in Toering, also stemmed from the Oil
Capitol II holding and extended it in the context of backpay proceedings
with respect to the discriminatee's attempt to mitigate damages.277
Specifically, the Board established that the burden of production for
setting forth evidence that refutes the contention that a discriminatee
failed to apply for significantly similar jobs, without good reason, during
the backpay period is on the discriminatee and the General Counsel.2 78
This case was analogous to Oil Capitol II in that it placed the evidentiary
burden on the party who would be in the better position to have access to
the evidence relating to the elements in question. 279 However, the Board
maintained the position that the burden of persuasion ultimately lies with
the respondent-employer who must show that "a discriminatee has failed
to make a reasonable search for work. ' '280
Despite the Board
maintaining certain established principles, there is an evident departure
in many respects from previous case law. 28' This decision has created
yet another obstacle for the General Counsel, on behalf of an alleged
discriminatee, to overcome when attempting to secure damages for that
individual.282
C. DecisionsAdhering to the Oil Capitol Framework
In light of Oil Capitol II, several AU opinions, which came before
the NLRB on appeal, have been altered in terms of the remedy initially
allocated. In Cossentino,283 the NLRB altered the remedy provided for
275. Id., slip op. at 21. But cf Bush Board Has Been Busy, supra note 261 (arguing that the
new framework would reduce costs associated with litigation). Employers now have the
opportunity to defend their actions by presenting facts to establish that an individual's job
application is in effect pretext for future litigation against that employer in an attempt to unionize.
Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 21.
276. 351 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (Sept. 30, 2007).
277. Id., slip op. at 1; Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 1.
278. St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 1.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Liebman Statement, supra note 220, at 16.
282. See St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 1. To obtain the full extent of
available damages, the General Counsel must now satisfy this burden. Id.
283. 351 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Sept. 29, 2007).
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by the ALJ so that it would be in compliance with the new framework
established by the Board in Oil Capitol H/.284 In McBurney Corp. 285 it
was set forth that two of the discrminatees were union salts and as such
would fall under the Oil Capitol II proof structure.286 Accordingly, the
AL's remedy was altered, as in Cossentino.28 7 Notably, in both
Cossentino and McBurney Corp., the opinions included footnotes
addressing the fact that Members Liebman and Walsh had dissented in
Oil Capitol II, but acknowledged that they were constrained to apply
these principles as they presently stand.28 8 Additionally, Cossentino was
affected by the Toering decision with respect to the issue of establishing
the genuine interest of the applicant. 289
It is clear from such decisions as Contractors Services Inc.,290 that
certain ALJ decisions will need to be remanded to determine backpay in
accordance with the new Oil Capitol II framework. 29 ' The Board
pointed out that upon remand in such cases, it will often be necessary to
gather additional evidence thus, the framework must be structured
accordingly.292 The abovementioned cases make it clear that Oil Capitol
II has both been applied to and will continue to significantly impact
cases pending before the NLRB. This includes cases that already have
come before an ALJ and are just now, via the appeals process, being
heard by the Board.
X. WHAT HAPPENED TO STARE DECISIS?

A criticism of the NLRB is that predicting when they will overturn
well-established precedent is as feasible as speculating when a tornado
will hit. 293 It can be argued that the NLRB never actually establishes

284. Cossentino ContractingCo., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 31, slip op. at 2.
285. 351 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Sept. 29, 2007).
286. McBurney Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 49, slip op. at 3-4.
287. Id.
288. Cossentino ContractingCo., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 31, slip op. at 2 n.6; McBurney Corp., 351
N.L.R.B. No. 49, slip op. at 4 n. 11. It is clear that Oil Capitol's dissenting members are still in
disagreement with the novel framework laid out, but yield to its application in subsequent cases "for
institutional reasons only." Cossentino Contracting Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 31, slip op. at 2 n.6;
McBurney Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 49, slip op. at 4 n. 11.
289. Cossentino Contracting Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 31, slip op. at 1. In the same footnote,

previously mentioned, the reservations also applied with respect to the Toering decision in this case.
Id., slip op. at 2 n.6.
290.
291.
292.
293.

351 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Sept. 27, 2007).
Id.,slipop. at 1.

Id.
See William N. Cooke & Frederick H. Gautschi Ill, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor
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precedent as evidenced by its frequency to change its views when new
presidential administrations take over. 294 With the election of a new
president comes the opportunity to appoint new Board members, which
arguably allows for alteration of the NLRB composition so that its
membership is more aligned with the policies and viewpoints of the new
electee.295 The proposition that the Board's inconsistency in its findings
is attributable to alterations in political composition has been prevalent
among critics virtually since the NLRB's formation.29 6 It is clear from
one case study on the Eisenhower administration that presidents tend to
impart their own views in this continuously expanding area of law
through their appointments of Board members.29 7
Further, in a more recent study, it was suggested that where the
Board member's political party affiliation is the same as the President's,
an interesting trend appears with respect to the Board member's
sympathy for a specific party.2 98 It was found that Democratic Party
affiliated Board members who were appointed into their positions by
Democratic presidents were far more inclined to express union friendly
views in reaching Board decisions. 299 On the other hand, Republican
Board members appointed by a president of the same political party,
tended to show more sympathy for employers. 30 0 Therefore, it was clear
from this study that political affiliation has an impact on NLRB
decisions. 30 '
The argument has been made that this political wavering has
negatively impacted employers and employees, as both will find it
difficult to center their cases on NLRB decisions. 30 2 "When the Board
makes the majority of its law through individual adjudications and

PracticeDecisions, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 539, 539 (1982).
294. See id.
295. Id. at 539-40; see also Claire Tuck, Policy Formulationat the NLRB: A Viable Alternative
to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOOzo L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2006).
296. Cooke & Gautschi Il1,supra note 293, at 540 ("[The] proper balance was never struck in
the first twelve years of the NLRB's history-and the consequences have been enduring." (quoting
JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL

LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1937-1947, 262 (Albany: State University of New York Press
1981)).
297. Id. (citing Seymour Scher, Regulatory Agency Control Through Appointment: The Case of
the Eisenhower Administrationand the NLRB, 23 J. OF POLS. 667, 667-68 (1961)).
298. Id. at 546.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. The impact of party affiliation was not as evident in cases where the Board member of
the opposite political party to the President was appointed. Id.
302. Tuck, supra note 294, at 1118.
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subsequently overturns many controversial decisions after a change in
presidential administration, labor organizations and employers hesitate
to invest in complying with current Board decisions. 3 °3 One might
hypothesize that as a result of the overturning of precedent in Oil Capitol
II, both salts and potential employers would be inclined to disregard this
new rule. Additionally, unions employing salts will be hurt more
significantly by such decisions since they often are less equipped to deal
with the associated expenses of litigating such matters.3 °4
Whenever the Presidency has shifted hands to the opposing

political party, alterations in the Board's ideologies have been clear,
irrespective of the entering party.30 5 Thus, it is a reality that with the
election of a Democratic candidate as President, the Board is likely to
demonstrate more union-friendly views, provided President Obama
appoints individuals from his own political party.30 6

Even more

noteworthy is that because Oil Capitol II is arguably favorable to
employers in some respects, there is potential that a newly composed
"Obama" Board might overturn this holding on appeal.
XI. CONCLUSION
There

is no question that the elimination of the automatic

presumption and the new evidentiary requirement associated with the
backpay period set forth in Oil CapitolH have been viewed by the legal
community as watershed decisions.30 7 This holding has been significant

303. Id.
304. Id. This is true because of the potential increase in cases that are brought to the litigation
stage since argument is needed with respect to what precedent is proper for application, considering
the inconsistency demonstrated by the Board. Id.
305. Id. at 1122.
306. For example, during the 2008 election, Democratic Candidate Barak Obama, subsequently
elected President, articulated his "pro-union" views during his campaign when he revealed that "[i]f
president, his appointees would be 'sympathetic' to labor." Lynn Sweet, Obama Clear: He's ProUnion, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 15, 2007, at 23. On the other hand, Republican Candidate John
McCain was perceived by unions such as the AFL-CIO and the United Steelworkers as being more
supportive of employers, based on his past actions of "[speaking] out against unions and . . .
[voting] against collective bargaining rights for workers." AFL-CIO.org, An Important Message
From
the
AFL-CIO:
McCain
Will
Not
Protect
Our
Rights,
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/politics/upload/mccain-rights.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2008). Leo
Gerard, President of the United Steelworkers, said that Senator McCain has a "long history of antiunion sentiment and anti-worker actions." Tony LaRussa, USW Not Swayed by McCain s New Link
to Union, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE REVIEW, Aug. 30, 2008.
307. See, e.g., Fulcher, supra note 130; Jed. L. Marcus, The NLRB Puts Employers on a "Low
Salt" Diet, LAB. & EMP. LAW UPDATE, (Bressler, Amery & Ross, New York, N.Y.) Oct. 2007; Poor
& Boldt, supra note 14.
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with respect to salting in that it has virtually lifted a weight off
employers' shoulders by shifting the evidentiary burden to the alleged
discriminatee salt.3 °s The trend set forth in Oil Capitol H has trickled
down to impact subsequent NLRB's rulings, most notably in Toering
Electric Co., thus "remov[ing]

.

.

.

[even more] 'salt'

from [the

employers'] wounds." 30 9 Although some labor law professionals, such
as NLRB Chairman Wilma Liebman and Professor Richard Bales, argue
310
this is making the already weak NLRA remedies essentially toothless,
it can be countered that such a change was warranted, as the sole
purpose of remedies is to make the discriminatee whole.31 It would be
contrary to the "make-whole" policy to provide for an automatic remedy
of indefinite backpay, since doing so could arguably put salts in better
positions than they were initially.
Despite the many criticisms of the NLRB, the actions of the Board
with respect to the Oil Capitol II decision could potentially be seen as
leveling the playing field for salts and employers, thus making such
criticisms inapplicable here. Mainly this decision has been critiqued on
the basis that the Board took it upon itself to raise this issue without
briefs by either party. While this could be seen as an improper method
of decision-making, it is within the authority of the Board to decide to
utilize its rulemaking ability rather than deciding a case with its
adjudicatory powers.31 2 The circumstances surrounding Oil Capitol H
warranted such an initiative by the Board as it was "effecting a change in
policy.

' 31 3

As the scales were disproportionately tipped in favor of the

employee in terms of production of evidence, it can be argued that such
a change was necessary and, as such, not an abuse of discretion by the
Board.
Although Oil Capitol H does fall within the parameters of the
political arguments previously discussed, it should not be seen as an
unfounded change made solely to advance political ideologies. It was
vital in this situation to balance the rights of unions, their represented
employees, and the targeted employers in order to rectify any unintended
308. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc. (Oil Capitol 11), 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 6 (May
31, 2007).
309. Poor & Boldt, supra note 14.
310. Liebman, supra note 16, at 585; see NLRB Changes Standard, supra note 25.
311. Oil Capitol11, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 5.
312. ST. ANTOINE, supra note 213, at 38-39 (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of
Textron, 416 U.S. 267 (1974)). According to the Supreme Court, this principle will hold true
provided that the Board does not abuse its discretion. Id. (citing Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of

Textron., 416 U.S. at 294).
313.

Id. (citing Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. at 294).
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favoritism that lingered from the Board's establishment of an indefinite
period of backpay for union salts in failure to hire or consider cases. As
such, this landmark decision should not be reversed on appeal nor
minimized in subsequent decisions even if the composition of the Board
is altered. Upholding this decision will arguably counter the criticism of
the Board as being unpredictable, in addition to maintaining sound
policy.
Several things are apparent, regarding the impact of this decision on
both unions and their targeted employers. One might argue that
employers will be more inclined to either fail to consider or hire an
individual they know to be a union salt as the consequences are much
less dire for such an offense. From the union's perspective, there may
be more skepticism with respect to using this method of organization
because of the increased amount of evidence needed in the event that its
salt is discriminated against in hiring. Further, as evidenced from Oil
Capitol II progeny such as Toering, they will need to find union
organizers who have a genuine interest in being employed with the
targeted employer, which might impede their use of this technique. The
union might also have to reveal its unionizing schemes when trying to
314
meet its evidentiary burden; something, it would be hesitant to do.
Despite the fact that some of these effects may appear to be negative,
perhaps in the grand scheme of things, considering the availability of
other alternative methods of unionization, a lower salt content is just
what the doctor ordered.
Katie A. Mabanta & Alyson B. Skloot*

314.

Poor & Boldt, supra note 14.

* Juris Doctor Candidates, 2009, Hofstra University School of Law.
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